The measures and policies states adopt and apply related to law enforcement at sea in peacetime, such as setting up and legislating about Coast Guards and their role, increasingly take maritime security into account. A grey area between military and civilian rules, actors, and activities, can be discerned in relation to maritime security. The article explores the issue of security concerns as a basis for the on-going widening of powers of the Finnish Border Guard, which includes the Coast Guard -in particular how such a widening of the powers relates to the Åland Islands' demilitarised status. The main question here is whether there is a conflict between possible military aspects of the Coast Guard vis-à-vis the demilitarised status of the Åland Islands. The article identifies aspects of a military nature regarding how the Finnish Coast Guard functions; these are not assessed as being decisive:
INTRODUCTION
Border environments are complex. They include a variety of issues and contain a wide range of actors. 1 Both mobility and security interests are present.
On the one hand, movement of persons and goods are seen as necessary to promote economic growth and social development. On the other hand, states also want to safeguard national security and combat transnational crimes such as smuggling and terrorism, 2 denoted as 'border security' by some, 3 which is handled through states' establishment of structures and processes for the purpose of confronting such challenges. As regards maritime borders, national security interests connected to the sea have traditionally related to military interests of states. This dimension remains significant, but there is increasing acceptance of a common interest that exists among states when seeking to respond to a variety of maritime security threats. 4 'Maritime security' has been an emerging concept for a number of years. However, there is no international consensus over the definition of 'maritime security', neither legally nor politically, and the prospect of arriving at consensus any time soon seems bleak. 5 The term maritime security has different meanings depending on who is using it or in what context it is being used. 6 Many international actors define maritime security by identifying a number of threats.
An aspect that should not be by-passed today in any discussion or analysis of security and military related issues is the increased fusion between civilian and military rules, actors, and activities. 7 For example, new modes of warfare, such as cyber-warfare, may erode, or erase, the distinction that currently exists between combatants (soldiers) and noncombatants (civilians). 8 A policy ingredient that seems to be gaining ground and pushing the boundaries in the on-going fusion ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 5 are assessed as most relevant for the Åland Islands' status, namely the use of (compulsory enrolled) conscripts by the Border Guard and the assistance to the Border Guard by the Defence Forces.
In this context it should be noted that Svalbard is another demilitarised territory within the boundaries of a Nordic state, Norway. However, it seems that juxtaposing the Svalbard and Åland Islands' demilitarisation regimes would not prove very useful in relation to the main question in this article, since the Norwegian Coast Guard from an organisational and legislative perspective can be seen as a 'naval Coast Guard', 12 and is not permanently present on Svalbard, as the Finnish Coast Guard is on the Åland Islands. The Norwegian Coast Guard only visits (around 40-50 visits per year in the last few years), 13 and all its vessels are homeported in Sortland in Northern Norway. The Norwegian Navy also visits Svalbard, but according to current practice just once a year. 14 Consequently, already at the first instance it seems clear that a possible exploration of 'Coast Guard issues' should be made from a slightly different perspective regarding
Svalbard.
The perspective of this contribution is that of international law, but elaborations on conceptual aspects as regards security will take also other perspectives into account.
First, main traits of the role of Coast Guards and the concepts border security, border management and maritime security will be described. Second, the powers of the Coast Guard in Finland will be explored, with a focus on the Åland Islands'
status. In the end, conclusions will be drawn.
COAST GUARDS AND BORDERS
The purpose of this section is to attempt to shed light on the terms border management and maritime security, since the perspective of this contribution is that they are fundamental for Coast Guards' tasks. First, a brief overview of the role of Coast Guards is given.
When the notion law enforcement is used in this article, it is intended as a general description of 'all' law enforcement powers. 15 In this article there will be no 12 exploration of the jurisdictional powers in the different maritime zones, such as internal waters, the territorial sea, Exclusive Economic Zone and so on, as this expands the scope too far.
THE ROLE OF COAST GUARDS
Until the twentieth century, coastal States were primarily concerned with the protection of their territory, although the rights of regulation and enforcement included such subjects as customs, fisheries, health and immigration. 16 The modem international law of the sea, reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, allows States to assert and exercise a multitude of sovereign rights and jurisdictions in zones beyond the territorial sea. 17 States exercised the powers of enforcement regarding these rights and jurisdictions in a variety of ways.
Some States deploy their navies and air forces in this role, supplementing them where necessary with equipment and officials of such agencies as customs, fisheries, and immigration departments. Other States have a designated coast guard service, which carries out all law enforcement activities at sea in peacetime. 18 Guilfoyle cites Till and states that as the concept of maritime security widens, "the extent of potential overlap" between naval and coast guard activities "is increasing and unregulated fishing and (7) intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) included maritime security as one of its objectives in its 2011 Alliance Maritime Strategy. 32 In 2014 the European Union (EU) launched an ambitious maritime security strategy. 33 Between 2013-2015, maritime powers France, India, Spain, the UK, and the US published crosssectoral national maritime security strategies, linked to their national security and maritime strategies. 34 Bueger assesses that the 'breakthrough' for maritime security came with the rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia between 2008 and 2011. 35 Jacobsson states that 'maritime security' became visible as a concept already in the 1990s and was clearly related to security policies. 36 The concept was present in naval disarmament discussions 37 and surfaced in the context of ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 9 proposals on naval confidence-building measures and so-called multilateral incidents agreement. 38 Some have advocated for an understanding of maritime security as a "stable order at sea". 39 In contrast to the 'negative' definition of maritime security as absence of a range of threats, this understanding provides a 'positive' conceptualisation, constituting the point of departure for a discussion about questions of how law enforcement at sea can be improved. 40 From a legal perspective, it is of interest to regard UNCLOS as a point of reference for understanding terms such as 'security', which are related to the law of the sea. 41 However, there are scant references to security in UNCLOS. 42 Nevertheless, there are indications in UNCLOS as to what might compromise security, in its identification series of activities that would be inconsistent with the right of innocent passage and prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal state. 43 It is not only a range of military activities that may pose a threat to the security of the coastal state (such as threats or use of force), but also fishing activities, willful and serious pollution, and research or survey activities. 44 Security interests influence the development of the law of the sea and contribute to changing the interpretation of the law of the sea. 45 The maritime interests can be said to be mirrored by the jurisdictional arrangements, or structure, agreed among states. Jacobsson clarifies that legally maritime security involves areas under the sovereignty of a state, areas under the jurisdiction of a coastal state, and areas over which no state has jurisdiction, but where other jurisdictional principles apply, primarily the flag state principle. 46 The jurisdictional arrangements are not permanent or unalterable, and are subject to
changes. An example of changes made, labeled by some as "creeping jurisdiction", 47 is the recognition of the Exclusive Economic Zone and rights over the continental shelf, motivated by states' greater claim to exclusive use.
For operators in the shipping industry, maritime security is particularly focused on the maritime transport system, relating to the safe arrival of cargo at its 38 Marie Jacobsson, supra note 27: 391-392; see e.g. Jozef Goldblat, ed., Maritime Security: The Building of Confidence UNIDIR (New York: United Nations, 1992). 39 James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, supra note 6, 1 40 Ibid. 41 ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 10 destination without interference or being subjected to criminal activity. 48 The
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has addressed maritime security issues since the 1980s, drawing a distinction between maritime safety and maritime security. 49 Maritime safety refers to minimizing the occurrence of accidents at sea that may be caused by for instance substandard ships, whereas maritime security is related to protection against unlawful and deliberate acts. 50 The issue of increased fusion of civilian and military aspects is very much on the agenda also regarding maritime security. The range of maritime issues in play today raise complex legal issues, and a fundamental question is what law to apply when a particular threat is to be countered. 51 Law enforcement powers are the point of departure, but for instance when states have exercised greater powers than is normally granted in particular maritime zones (mostly powers of interdiction), recourse has been made to the right of self-defence and naval warfare. 52 The so-called 'war on terror' following the attacks in New York City, on September 11, 2001 , has brought to light and contributed to the increasing fusion between law enforcement, Security Council action, the right to self-defence, and the law of naval warfare. 53 Kraska and Pedrozo state that: "Maritime security operations lie at the uncomfortable nexus between maritime law enforcement and naval warfare." 54 It is not possible to explore this issue further within the limits of this contribution, but in sec. 4 some concluding comments will be made regarding this topic.
As indicated above, the term maritime security is seldom defined in a categorical way. 55 Bueger assesses that the practical meaning will always vary across actors, time and space, and that striving for a universally acceptable definition of maritime security is an unproductive quest. 56 A practical approach is to identify what are perceived as existing or potential threats to maritime security, and the measures that have been, or need to be, taken to address these threats. 57 The approach in the 2008 UN Secretary-General Report concerning which threats that can be identified as maritime security threats 58 is the point of departure for this article. 48 Natalie Klein, supra note 4, 8. 49 Ibid.; Marie Jacobsson supra note 27: 393. 50 Marie Jacobsson, supra note 27: 393-394. 51 Discussed by Natalie Klein, supra note 4, 297 ff, 321 ff. 52 Ibid., 298. 53 Ibid. 54 James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, supra note 6, 2. 55 Natalie Klein, supra note 4, 11. 56 Ian Bueger, supra note 5: 163. 57 Natalie Klein, supra note 4, 11 58 United Nations (UN), supra note 30.
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FINLAND AND THE ÅLAND ISLANDS

FINLAND AND MARITIME SECURITY
Finland is a maritime nation. About 90% of its exports and 80% of its imports are carried by sea. 59 The high proportion of foreign trade transported by sea makes it essential that sea routes are well-functioning and safe. Clearly, security regarding its maritime interests is crucial for Finland. However, the concept maritime security as such does not seem to be referred to in legal contexts. For instance, in the latest as the recent Government Bills on the Finnish Border Guard, are not numerous, but carry that much weight that they suffice as a basis for at least a tentative conclusion that the concept maritime security has not been discussed, at least not to any large extent, in official legal contexts in Finland.
However, in policy contexts there are also other examples of official positions than the Finnish participation under the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan. comes to policy. This view gains support from the assessment by Lundqvist who asserts that Finland's and Sweden's gradual implementation of the concept has followed the EU path rather than a national one, and that the two countries have incorporated the EU maritime security concept. 65
THE ÅLAND ISLANDS
REGULATORY BACKGROUND
The The 2017 Consentaneous Decree, the Border Guard Act 76 and the Autonomy Act, are the basis for the Border Guard's tasks in the Åland Islands.
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST MILITARY, NAVAL OR AIR FORCES
IN THE ÅLAND ISLANDS
The conventions 77 containing the provisions on the demilitarisation and Stipulations include that Åland is not to be fortified and, in war time, "a neutral zone". 81 However, there is a need to keep in mind that the demilitarisation and neutralisation regime is 'more' than an analysis of the conventions in question; the regime can be said to involve "a series of regulations, institutions and processes at various levels, national as well as international". 82 
THE TASKS OF THE FINNISH BORDER GUARD AND GROWING
POWERS
The Border Guard's responsibilities have continued to grow over the years. 93 Sec. 3 in the 2005 Border Guard Act describes the border guard's responsibilities and tasks. The main task is 'border management'. 94 In the 2005 revision, the crime combating powers of the Border Guard were enhanced, 95 and subsequently there have been further strengthening of these powers. 96 In order to make it clearer which competencies the Border Guard holds in that field, a Government Bill was presented to Parliament in 2017 proposing a separate act on the Border Guard's crime combating powers. 97 The Bill resulted in the Act on Crime
Combating by the Border Guard that came into force in April 2018, 98 which changed the Border Guard's powers in this regard slightly, 99 but not in any significant way, according to the Finnish Ministry of the Interior. 100 In Government Bill 201/2017, which proposed the latest widening of the Finnish Border Guard's powers, the hybrid threat was emphasised as a ground for the measures proposed in the Bill. 101 The Finnish Parliament adopted the proposals in question on 27 November 2018, with only minor changes made in relation to the initial ones. 102 There have also been other legislative proposals and enactments in Executive assistance can be needed, and is given, both in fields under Ålandic powers and state powers. The Ålandic Government has stated that the fact that today's authorities need to be more specialised results in increased executive assistance being provided among authorities, and that this can lead to an increased fusion of military and civilian activities, for instance when dealing with threats of a civilian nature, which is a growing problem in relation to the demilitarisation. 112
The Constitutional Law Committee, 113 the Defence Committee, 114 
THE NATURE OF THE FINNISH BORDER GUARD
The nature of the Finnish Border Guard, and any possible military aspects, in relation to the Åland Islands' demilitarised status has been discussed over the years. 118 In 1989 Rosas and Björkholm explored the topic and reached the conclusion that it was possible to interpret the 1921 Convention in the way that art. Defence, and, the Border Guard did not form part of the Defence Forces in peace time. 125 In the current legislation in force it is still stated that the inner organisation of the Border Guard is military. 126 It is also stated that the Border Guard takes part in the defence of the country. 127 According to the current legislation in force it is However, all in all it seems that the Ålandic Government sticks to the view that non-military aspects are outweighing military ones. In the 2015 "Policy for the Åland Islands' demilitarisation and neutralisation", the Ålandic Government assesses that even though some of the legislation concerning the Border Guard seem to underline military aspects, the regular work and daily tasks of the Border Guard can be seen as constituting tasks that are not of a military nature. 136
CONSCRIPTS IN THE FINNISH BORDER GUARD
A highly interesting issue related to the Border Guard's activities in the Åland
Islands is the use of conscripts for Border Guard tasks. It seems to be the firm view was also clarified that the conscripts were subordinate to the immediate leadership and worked under continuous supervision. 145 The Ålandic Government was asked for its views on the draft Bill before it was finalised, and had some comments, 146 but at that time none specifically on the use of conscripts as support for the Border Guard.
Conscripts' legal position in general is grounded in sec. 127 in the Finnish Constitution 147 on the obligation to defend the country, and on the Conscription Act, 148 that details the obligation. 149 The Finnish Parliamentary Constitutional Law
Committee has pointed out that the conscripts that are appointed to support the Border Guard are not employed by the Defence Forces or the Border Guard. 150
Rather, it is their duty to serve according to sec. 57 in the Conscription Act. The Defence Committee on Bill 201/2017 states that: according to the information to the Committee such support would be given in extraordinary situations, and there has not been a need for such support for the Border Guard Firstly, the formulation on terrorism had been softened. The changes made inter alia entails that the combating of terrorism can be seen as such exceptional circumstances as those referred to in art. 4.a, but this will always be decided on case-by-case basis. Furthermore, it is stated that executive assistance that will encompass the use of military force will be decided on by the Finnish Government, and the international conventions on the demilitarisation and neutralisation, as well as foreign policy aspects, will be taken into account in connection with such a decision.
Secondly, regarding conscripts the formulation had also been softened in the final version of the Bill, although seemingly not fully in line with the Ålandic One reason to keep in mind is: if one accepts that there is a fundamental policy in international law that the need to resort to the use of force is to be minimised to promote public order, then it would seem that responses to maritime security threats would be tailored accordingly. This approach would mean that it is not appropriate for states to extend the law of naval warfare into times of peace. 179
In particular, this contribution has explored the issue of security concerns in First, it was clarified that there is a prohibition, also concerning Finland, in the 1921 Åland Convention for military, naval, or air forces to enter and remain in the Åland Islands. However, there are certain exceptions for Finland, which have not been examined in depth in this article, but can be summarised as follows. One or two light surface warships can visit the islands from time to time and may anchor temporarily. Finland may also, if important special circumstances demand, send into the waters of the zone and keep other surface ships there temporarily. In practice the rule seems to have been interpreted to mean that the presence of terrorism activities will always be decided on case-by-case basis. Furthermore, it is clarified in the Bill that executive assistance that will encompass the use of military force will be decided on by the Finnish Government, and the international conventions on the demilitarisation and neutralisation as well as foreign policy aspects will be taken into account in connection with such a decision. This is a seemingly satisfactory solution for the Åland Islands' authorities. It remains to be seen how it will play out.
The issue of executive assistance is also of interest per se. The "mix" of an authority's own powers and its powers to provide executive assistance to another authority, if asked by the latter authority, often renders the overview of the actual powers of an authority quite complex. Regarding the Ålands Islands there is also the additional factor of the division of powers between the Åland Islands and the state. Executive assistance can be needed, and is given, both in fields under Ålandic powers and state powers. The Ålandic guidelines on executive assistance are ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019
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perhaps not the final say on this issue. An additional aspect to take into consideration in this context is the assessment that there is a tendency in Finland, both in law and policy, of using military means when responding to non-military threats, for instance in the case of natural disasters or major accidents at sea in Finland. 181 The need for a comprehensive exploration and analysis -including both
Finnish authorities and Ålandic authorities -of the Åland Islands' status in relation to possible future 'threatening situations' and assistance by the Defence Forces, independently or through executive assistance to other authorities, on the Åland Islands, has been highlighted on several occasions and in different contexts, as noted above. The complexity of the task and its political consideration are perhaps difficult obstacles to overcome.
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